2014 NBA Playoffs 1st Round Preview

This is my first attempt at building a simple model for estimating NBA playoff series.  The idea was inspired by colts18 on the APBR forums.  The model is based off of the xRAPM numbers on ESPN (where it's called "real plus minus"), which are supposedly the most predictive of the all-in-one metrics for NBA games.  I utilized my own minutes estimates for each series (subjectively based on regular season minutes, an increase  for each team's top players in the playoffs, and potential matchup adjustments I expect each coach to employ) to calculate each team's offensive and defensive rating (the league average points per possession is set to 104 by weighting each team's offensive/defensive rating by each team's pace).  Then, I assumed 100 possessions per game (which is most definitely not true) and a home court advantage of four points (divided evenly between offensive and defense, so 1 point per team per side of the ball) to calculate each team's Pythagorean win percentage at home and on the road, and used Bill James' Log 5 formula for estimating a matchup based on each team's win%.  Finally, assuming games are independent (which, again, is also not true), each permutation was considered to calculate a team's series win percentage.  All of the computation was done in R and the script I ran will be included as well.  I will then comment on any other subjective observations for each series.

Tanking in the NBA

People disagree about the significance of the tanking problem in the NBA, but no one doubts that it exists.  Most of the media coverage on tanking has focused only on the race for draft lottery ping-pong balls that was especially evident this year, given the expected strength of the incoming draft class and the projected gap between the top teams and the bottom teams before the season even began.  This kind of tanking can manifest in many different forms and degrees, with some front offices actively trading away productive players (Boston trading Pierce, Garnett, Lee, and Crawford or Philadelphia trading Turner and Hawes), others benching players towards the end of the year citing bogus injuries (Milwaukee holding Sanders out until it was beneficial to medically clear him to start his marijuana suspension), and others simply making no effort to improve the team at any point in the season (Philadelphia not bothering to reach the salary floor or Utah trading for Jefferson and Biedrins to reach the salary floor).  Still, this might not even be the most egregious manner by which teams actively trying to lose games, as many of these draft lottery tankers initially tried to compete and arguably only Philadelphia, Utah, and Boston stuck to season-long losing blueprints.  There are two rules that even more directly incentive teams to intentionally lose, and each of these is more easily fixable.