-It is entirely qualitative, because the purpose of this exercise is more about predicting how certain skills will perform in the NBA rather than estimating those skills. There will certainly be some numbers, but they will be used as supplements rather than as predictive models on their own.
-It is based off of secondary research, because I watch very little NCAA basketball every year before March Madness, and as a result I will be using mostly outside sources for estimates in players’ skill levels.
-It assumes my own utility curve, meaning others might have a different risk tolerance than I do and prefer someone lower on my list solely because that player's distribution of career outcomes matches their preferences better. For example, given their incentives, team executives most likely would prefer safer options over higher-upside options.
-I will only be ranking the players of whom I have some opinion. As a result, even after stripping out team context, I probably wouldn’t draft the 15th ranked player 15th in the draft, for example, because there are likely other players I haven’t ranked that are better choices. I may add players in future versions as I learn more about them.
One last note is that for a number of reasons, I would not grade my board by simply measuring how well it ultimately ends up predicting NBA success. For one, there isn't exactly a consensus means of measuring NBA success, and even if there were, it would still be an incorrect rubric because it assumes that I am risk neutral (which isn't true as I prefer higher upside players, especially at the top of the draft). Furthermore, my rankings are based off of other people's opinions of each player's skillsets, so a specific player might end up having more or less success than expected if my sources under/over-estimated his skills. Instead, my board should be more useful in providing a different perspective in how specific draftees might fit in the NBA assuming the consensus opinions regarding their skillsets.
Tier 1:
1) Joel Embiid
Strengths: size/length, mobility, shooting potential, footwork
Weaknesses: injuries, lack of elite hops
67th-percentile outcome: cross between Andrew Bynum (the soft hands, footwork, and defensive length) and Al Horford (the shooting range and defensive mobility)
Comments:
I have no idea how predictive his back injuries should be for his future health, but the only real non-injury-related concern about Embiid is the lack of elite hops, which does somewhat limit his defensive potential. However, he has the length and mobility to overcome that if he’s able to learn proper defensive positioning. Offensively, his low-post potential has been likened to Olajuwon’s but I prefer my Andrew Bynum comparison as Olajuwon’s footwork was simply unparalleled. However, given the state of the league now and how it’s extremely difficult for an NBA big man to be a major positive offensively without a 3-point shot, if I were coaching the team that drafted him, I’d rather he work on his shooting range instead. Regardless, the skills are all there for him to be one of the top big men in the game as long as he stays on the court.
Weaknesses: injuries, lack of elite hops
67th-percentile outcome: cross between Andrew Bynum (the soft hands, footwork, and defensive length) and Al Horford (the shooting range and defensive mobility)
Comments:
I have no idea how predictive his back injuries should be for his future health, but the only real non-injury-related concern about Embiid is the lack of elite hops, which does somewhat limit his defensive potential. However, he has the length and mobility to overcome that if he’s able to learn proper defensive positioning. Offensively, his low-post potential has been likened to Olajuwon’s but I prefer my Andrew Bynum comparison as Olajuwon’s footwork was simply unparalleled. However, given the state of the league now and how it’s extremely difficult for an NBA big man to be a major positive offensively without a 3-point shot, if I were coaching the team that drafted him, I’d rather he work on his shooting range instead. Regardless, the skills are all there for him to be one of the top big men in the game as long as he stays on the court.
Tier 2:
2) Dante Exum
Strengths: quickness/speed, length, offensive awareness
Weaknesses: shooting, strength
75th-percentile outcome: Dwyane Wade (but with slightly worse hops)
Comments:
Exum likely has the highest 75th percentile of anyone in the draft because his combination of length, quickness, and offensive awareness are ideal for an offensive creator and the first two characteristics also elevate his defensive potential (especially if he’s able to operate as the primary ball handler, which would allow him to defend opposing PGs), while his weaknesses are ones that young players usually improve over time. Of the players at the combine who could conceivably become primary offensive creators, Exum was the second longest (after Kyle Anderson, who’ll likely match up against forwards so he almost doesn’t count) and second fastest/quickest (essentially tied with DeAndre Kane after Zach LaVine). One of his perceived weaknesses is his vertical explosiveness, but his combine verticals were average for a guard (and comparing to him to other guards punishes him because he’s taller than the other guards). In reality, his biggest obstacle will be his jumper, because his combination of length and quickness will make it difficult for defenses to defend both his shot and his drive. Fortunately, many players exhibit drastic improvements in shooting after they enter the league (for example, Kyle Lowry), and the consensus is that Exum’s jumper is nowhere near MCW levels right now. If Exum falls to the Sixers and they can find a team willing to give up a pick in the 5-10 range for Michael Carter-Williams, they absolutely should make that switch (I would even trade MCW for a pick in the 10-15 range, but that might alienate a fan base that was already frustrated with the team’s tanking last season).
3) Noah VonlehWeaknesses: shooting, strength
75th-percentile outcome: Dwyane Wade (but with slightly worse hops)
Comments:
Exum likely has the highest 75th percentile of anyone in the draft because his combination of length, quickness, and offensive awareness are ideal for an offensive creator and the first two characteristics also elevate his defensive potential (especially if he’s able to operate as the primary ball handler, which would allow him to defend opposing PGs), while his weaknesses are ones that young players usually improve over time. Of the players at the combine who could conceivably become primary offensive creators, Exum was the second longest (after Kyle Anderson, who’ll likely match up against forwards so he almost doesn’t count) and second fastest/quickest (essentially tied with DeAndre Kane after Zach LaVine). One of his perceived weaknesses is his vertical explosiveness, but his combine verticals were average for a guard (and comparing to him to other guards punishes him because he’s taller than the other guards). In reality, his biggest obstacle will be his jumper, because his combination of length and quickness will make it difficult for defenses to defend both his shot and his drive. Fortunately, many players exhibit drastic improvements in shooting after they enter the league (for example, Kyle Lowry), and the consensus is that Exum’s jumper is nowhere near MCW levels right now. If Exum falls to the Sixers and they can find a team willing to give up a pick in the 5-10 range for Michael Carter-Williams, they absolutely should make that switch (I would even trade MCW for a pick in the 10-15 range, but that might alienate a fan base that was already frustrated with the team’s tanking last season).
Strengths: size/length, hand size, mobility, shooting potential
Weaknesses: court awareness
75th-percentile outcome: Serge Ibaka
Comments:
Vonleh’s certainly not as athletic as Ibaka (both in terms of mobility and leaping ability) but he’s likely much stronger (Ibaka’s limited strength is a problem for him when defending the post). Like Ibaka, Vonleh has good shooting range, as he shot 48.5% from three (albeit on only 33 total attempts) and 72% from the line (on a larger sample size of 134 attempts), but also like Ibaka, his court awareness on both ends is awful. Still, an elite defensive big that can also spread the floor is so valuable that this potential alone makes Vonleh an elite prospect.
4) Marcus SmartWeaknesses: court awareness
75th-percentile outcome: Serge Ibaka
Comments:
Vonleh’s certainly not as athletic as Ibaka (both in terms of mobility and leaping ability) but he’s likely much stronger (Ibaka’s limited strength is a problem for him when defending the post). Like Ibaka, Vonleh has good shooting range, as he shot 48.5% from three (albeit on only 33 total attempts) and 72% from the line (on a larger sample size of 134 attempts), but also like Ibaka, his court awareness on both ends is awful. Still, an elite defensive big that can also spread the floor is so valuable that this potential alone makes Vonleh an elite prospect.
Strengths: strength, size/length, hand size, quickness/speed
Weaknesses: shooting, shot selection
75th-percentile outcome: taller/longer Kyle Lowry
Comments:
As with Exum, Smart’s strengths are unique and his weaknesses can be improved. The Lowry comparison is apt, because Lowry also came into the league as a bruising penetrator with a poor outside shot, and his shot selection has been questioned as recently as last year. Smart has all of the physical tools necessary, as he’s long, strong, and quick, allowing him to drive to the basket at will on offense and harass ball handlers on defense, and his size presents even more lineup flexibility as he can comfortably defend most NBA shooting guards and can switch onto even bigger players if necessary (defensively, he profiles as Jason Kidd). If he can improve his shooting, he has the potential to be a top three point guard in the league.
5) Jabari ParkerWeaknesses: shooting, shot selection
75th-percentile outcome: taller/longer Kyle Lowry
Comments:
As with Exum, Smart’s strengths are unique and his weaknesses can be improved. The Lowry comparison is apt, because Lowry also came into the league as a bruising penetrator with a poor outside shot, and his shot selection has been questioned as recently as last year. Smart has all of the physical tools necessary, as he’s long, strong, and quick, allowing him to drive to the basket at will on offense and harass ball handlers on defense, and his size presents even more lineup flexibility as he can comfortably defend most NBA shooting guards and can switch onto even bigger players if necessary (defensively, he profiles as Jason Kidd). If he can improve his shooting, he has the potential to be a top three point guard in the league.
Strengths: polished scoring moves
Weaknesses: no clear position (may be too small to defend PFs and too slow to defend SFs), poor outside shot
75th-percentile outcome: Carmelo Anthony
Comments:
The Carmelo Anthony comparison fits on many levels, as their games are very similar both visually and statistically. Carmelo even had the same issues in his year at Syracuse with his shooting from both behind the arc and at the line that Jabari did (relative to expectations that is), and that’s obviously no longer an issue for Carmelo. However, there are some essential differences, as Dean Demakis points out. One, Jabari was an even bigger chucker than Carmelo, which is extremely problematic if his shooting doesn’t make the same improvements that Carmelo’s did. Two, he performed significantly worse against the better defenses (his discrepancy is even greater than it is for most players), which, assuming it isn’t heavily influenced by noise (a leap of faith given the sample sizes we’re dealing with), suggests he may struggle in the NBA against more athletic defenders. Still, his offensive polish is extremely rare for a prospect and he’s surprisingly athletic as well (he wasn’t present at the combine, but his block/steal numbers suggest good athleticism), and if he’s indeed as chubby as he looks (again, there are no combine results for his body fat percentage), then his athleticism upside is even greater assuming he can get in better shape. Still, the under-the-surface concerns about his offense make him a much less of a sure thing than people believe, and given that even at his best he projects to add value only on offense, I can’t place him higher than fifth.
Weaknesses: no clear position (may be too small to defend PFs and too slow to defend SFs), poor outside shot
75th-percentile outcome: Carmelo Anthony
Comments:
The Carmelo Anthony comparison fits on many levels, as their games are very similar both visually and statistically. Carmelo even had the same issues in his year at Syracuse with his shooting from both behind the arc and at the line that Jabari did (relative to expectations that is), and that’s obviously no longer an issue for Carmelo. However, there are some essential differences, as Dean Demakis points out. One, Jabari was an even bigger chucker than Carmelo, which is extremely problematic if his shooting doesn’t make the same improvements that Carmelo’s did. Two, he performed significantly worse against the better defenses (his discrepancy is even greater than it is for most players), which, assuming it isn’t heavily influenced by noise (a leap of faith given the sample sizes we’re dealing with), suggests he may struggle in the NBA against more athletic defenders. Still, his offensive polish is extremely rare for a prospect and he’s surprisingly athletic as well (he wasn’t present at the combine, but his block/steal numbers suggest good athleticism), and if he’s indeed as chubby as he looks (again, there are no combine results for his body fat percentage), then his athleticism upside is even greater assuming he can get in better shape. Still, the under-the-surface concerns about his offense make him a much less of a sure thing than people believe, and given that even at his best he projects to add value only on offense, I can’t place him higher than fifth.
Tier 3:
6) Kyle Anderson
Strengths: length, passing/vision, court awareness
Weaknesses: quickness/speed
50th-percentile outcome: Boris Diaw
Comments:
The Boris Diaw comparison might seem discouraging, but Diaw has provided excellent complementary skills in his career to teams already stacked with players who can create offense or protect the rim (skills that usually make what the media considers “stars”), and in reality, Anderson actually has better ball skills than Diaw so his upside is much greater. Anderson’s athleticism isn’t likely to be an issue offensively, as he’s always been able to use his handles and length (and corresponding long strides) to get into the paint, but defensively, it’s questionable whether his length will be able to overcome his limited foot speed when defending perimeter players. Ideally, if he can add some additional muscle, he would be able to defend PFs, especially since his length is similar to that of elite bigs (for example, his standing reach is only 0.5 inches shorter than Vonleh’s), and the point power forward is an extremely deadly offensive weapon. His functional athleticism might even not be that bad, as he averaged 2.0 steals and 0.9 blocks per 36 minutes in his college career, better than Wiggins’ 1.3 and 1.1 (yes, scheme matters, but the point is that Anderson isn’t horrible). Like Jabari, his athleticism could improve significantly if he were to lose some body fat, as his body fat percentage graded out as the third highest of the combine participants at 13.35%; Draymond Green serves as an example of how high body fat can mask sneaky athleticism (Draymond was at 11.3% at his combine). Furthermore, he improved his shooting significantly last year, which bodes well for both his floor (given how much more dangerous he would be with legitimate three-point range) as well as his ceiling (as he’s shown the work ethic to improve, and like Draymond, he could conceivably alter his body completely).
7) Aaron GordonWeaknesses: quickness/speed
50th-percentile outcome: Boris Diaw
Comments:
The Boris Diaw comparison might seem discouraging, but Diaw has provided excellent complementary skills in his career to teams already stacked with players who can create offense or protect the rim (skills that usually make what the media considers “stars”), and in reality, Anderson actually has better ball skills than Diaw so his upside is much greater. Anderson’s athleticism isn’t likely to be an issue offensively, as he’s always been able to use his handles and length (and corresponding long strides) to get into the paint, but defensively, it’s questionable whether his length will be able to overcome his limited foot speed when defending perimeter players. Ideally, if he can add some additional muscle, he would be able to defend PFs, especially since his length is similar to that of elite bigs (for example, his standing reach is only 0.5 inches shorter than Vonleh’s), and the point power forward is an extremely deadly offensive weapon. His functional athleticism might even not be that bad, as he averaged 2.0 steals and 0.9 blocks per 36 minutes in his college career, better than Wiggins’ 1.3 and 1.1 (yes, scheme matters, but the point is that Anderson isn’t horrible). Like Jabari, his athleticism could improve significantly if he were to lose some body fat, as his body fat percentage graded out as the third highest of the combine participants at 13.35%; Draymond Green serves as an example of how high body fat can mask sneaky athleticism (Draymond was at 11.3% at his combine). Furthermore, he improved his shooting significantly last year, which bodes well for both his floor (given how much more dangerous he would be with legitimate three-point range) as well as his ceiling (as he’s shown the work ethic to improve, and like Draymond, he could conceivably alter his body completely).
Strengths: athleticism, defensive awareness, motor, passing, youth (youngest prospect in the draft and doesn’t turn 19 until just before the season)
Weaknesses: shooting, too small to defend PFs and too limited to play SF offensively
75th percentile outcome: a cross between Shawn Marion (the athleticism defensively and the finishing ability offensively) and Andre Iguodala (the court awareness on both ends)
Comments:
I’ve recently completely 360-ed on my outlook for Gordon, as my main concerns earlier revolved around his inability to play PF on defense (namely, to defend the post and protect the rim) and his inability to play SF on offense (because he can’t shoot). Firstly, despite being considered a solid defensive player by the mainstream media, there were concerns about how his defense would translate to the NBA given his extremely lackluster stocks numbers (1.2 blocks and 1.0 steals per 36 minutes) that cast doubt on both his defensive and athletic reputations. Furthermore, his horrific outside shooting seemed to cap his offensive ceiling given that there would likely be at least two non-shooters on the floor any time he plays (and perhaps even three if Gordon plays SF and his team does not have a stretch four).
However, there have been new revelations that positively shift his outcome distributions on both sides of the ball. His combine athleticism results were elite; he posted the best shuttle run overall (made more impressive because these drills favor smaller players), the best lane agility for a non-PG, and the best verticals for a big man. While combine athleticism isn’t perfectly correlated with functional athleticism (Harrison Barnes, for example, had an epic combine two years ago), there is evidence that Sean Miller’s scheme instructed its players not to gamble or over-help (which muted all of the Wildcats’ steals numbers), instead priding itself on effectively closing out on shooters, containing penetration, and not fouling, and Gordon was able to accomplish each of these tenets superbly. Furthermore, in the admittedly small sample size of the FIBA u19 tournament, Gordon posted the third highest steal rate on the team behind Smart and Elfrid Payton, who were two of the best thieves in college basketball, and Gordon had the largest positive discrepancy between his FIBA and NCAA steal rates, suggesting again that he was specifically instructed to not gamble at Arizona. All evidence points to Gordon being an elite defender (at Smart’s level, but probably even better given his position, and certainly much better than Wiggins’), and his ability to adapt to different schemes is just icing on the cake for whatever team that drafts him, and he could even defend most bigs adequately despite being ideally used as a perimeter stopper. Offensively, he’s also not as broken as it may seem. There are examples of players who struggled to shoot in college but ended up eventually being adequate shooters in the NBA, for example Trevor Ariza (23.7% from three and 50.4% from the line in college) and Kawhi (25.0% from three in college). A few isolated cases certainly don’t mean Gordon will improve his shooting significantly, as there are a lot more examples of players who didn’t improve, but at the very least, it’s not impossible. Furthermore, he likely can still be at least a neutral offensive player even without an adequate long-range stroke. His offensive game profiles similarly to that of Andre Iguodala, as his handles and court awareness separate him from Marion and Leonard. With a good coach that utilizes him correctly on offense (specifically, coaching him to only shoot corner threes and layups), he can at the very least have a Tony Allen-level impact. If his shooting improves to Leonard/Ariza levels, he has the potential to be a better Andre Iguodala, and the actual Iguodala is already consistently among the tops in the NBA in RAPM.
Weaknesses: shooting, too small to defend PFs and too limited to play SF offensively
75th percentile outcome: a cross between Shawn Marion (the athleticism defensively and the finishing ability offensively) and Andre Iguodala (the court awareness on both ends)
Comments:
I’ve recently completely 360-ed on my outlook for Gordon, as my main concerns earlier revolved around his inability to play PF on defense (namely, to defend the post and protect the rim) and his inability to play SF on offense (because he can’t shoot). Firstly, despite being considered a solid defensive player by the mainstream media, there were concerns about how his defense would translate to the NBA given his extremely lackluster stocks numbers (1.2 blocks and 1.0 steals per 36 minutes) that cast doubt on both his defensive and athletic reputations. Furthermore, his horrific outside shooting seemed to cap his offensive ceiling given that there would likely be at least two non-shooters on the floor any time he plays (and perhaps even three if Gordon plays SF and his team does not have a stretch four).
However, there have been new revelations that positively shift his outcome distributions on both sides of the ball. His combine athleticism results were elite; he posted the best shuttle run overall (made more impressive because these drills favor smaller players), the best lane agility for a non-PG, and the best verticals for a big man. While combine athleticism isn’t perfectly correlated with functional athleticism (Harrison Barnes, for example, had an epic combine two years ago), there is evidence that Sean Miller’s scheme instructed its players not to gamble or over-help (which muted all of the Wildcats’ steals numbers), instead priding itself on effectively closing out on shooters, containing penetration, and not fouling, and Gordon was able to accomplish each of these tenets superbly. Furthermore, in the admittedly small sample size of the FIBA u19 tournament, Gordon posted the third highest steal rate on the team behind Smart and Elfrid Payton, who were two of the best thieves in college basketball, and Gordon had the largest positive discrepancy between his FIBA and NCAA steal rates, suggesting again that he was specifically instructed to not gamble at Arizona. All evidence points to Gordon being an elite defender (at Smart’s level, but probably even better given his position, and certainly much better than Wiggins’), and his ability to adapt to different schemes is just icing on the cake for whatever team that drafts him, and he could even defend most bigs adequately despite being ideally used as a perimeter stopper. Offensively, he’s also not as broken as it may seem. There are examples of players who struggled to shoot in college but ended up eventually being adequate shooters in the NBA, for example Trevor Ariza (23.7% from three and 50.4% from the line in college) and Kawhi (25.0% from three in college). A few isolated cases certainly don’t mean Gordon will improve his shooting significantly, as there are a lot more examples of players who didn’t improve, but at the very least, it’s not impossible. Furthermore, he likely can still be at least a neutral offensive player even without an adequate long-range stroke. His offensive game profiles similarly to that of Andre Iguodala, as his handles and court awareness separate him from Marion and Leonard. With a good coach that utilizes him correctly on offense (specifically, coaching him to only shoot corner threes and layups), he can at the very least have a Tony Allen-level impact. If his shooting improves to Leonard/Ariza levels, he has the potential to be a better Andre Iguodala, and the actual Iguodala is already consistently among the tops in the NBA in RAPM.
Tier 4:
8) Zach LaVine
9) Andrew Wiggins
LaVine
Strengths: athleticism, length excellent for a PG and adequate for a SG, good shooter with range
Weaknesses: poor handles and offensive awareness, extremely reluctant and poor finisher
90th-percentile outcome: Russell Westbrook with a better jumper
Wiggins
Strengths: Vertical explosiveness, length
Weaknesses: Poor handles and offensive awareness, poor outside shooter
50th-percentile outcome: Harrison Barnes
Comments:
I’ve included LaVine and Wiggins together because they both share many similarities to Harrison Barnes. Like Barnes, LaVine dominated the combine, but also like Barnes, those athletic abilities didn’t show up defensively in terms of stocks (LaVine posted 1.3 steals and 0.2 blocks per 36 minutes while Barnes posted 1.1 steals and 0.5 blocks per 36 minutes). Like Barnes, Wiggins supposedly has all the necessary offensive tools, but also like Barnes, he failed to make a significant impact in the half court due to poor handles and vision, an inability to finish around the rim, and a maddening tendency to settle for pull-up long twos. The advantage for LaVine is that he was a better outside shooter than both Barnes and Wiggins, and he can conceivably contribute as an average SG offensively even if his PG skills don’t develop. For Wiggins, his advantage is superior length (even to Barnes) and slightly better offensive numbers across the board than Barnes (most importantly, probably, FTA). Still, Self’s system is known to overinflate his players’ offensive numbers and without a more in-depth comparison it’s not clear Wiggins projects better than Barnes. Comparing LaVine and Wiggins, LaVine’s advantage in shooting gives him the better offensive outlook (even if shooting the most volatile skill), and while Wiggins is better defensively, he’s still overrated on that end. As a result, I have LaVine just ahead of Wiggins.
Strengths: athleticism, length excellent for a PG and adequate for a SG, good shooter with range
Weaknesses: poor handles and offensive awareness, extremely reluctant and poor finisher
90th-percentile outcome: Russell Westbrook with a better jumper
Wiggins
Strengths: Vertical explosiveness, length
Weaknesses: Poor handles and offensive awareness, poor outside shooter
50th-percentile outcome: Harrison Barnes
Comments:
I’ve included LaVine and Wiggins together because they both share many similarities to Harrison Barnes. Like Barnes, LaVine dominated the combine, but also like Barnes, those athletic abilities didn’t show up defensively in terms of stocks (LaVine posted 1.3 steals and 0.2 blocks per 36 minutes while Barnes posted 1.1 steals and 0.5 blocks per 36 minutes). Like Barnes, Wiggins supposedly has all the necessary offensive tools, but also like Barnes, he failed to make a significant impact in the half court due to poor handles and vision, an inability to finish around the rim, and a maddening tendency to settle for pull-up long twos. The advantage for LaVine is that he was a better outside shooter than both Barnes and Wiggins, and he can conceivably contribute as an average SG offensively even if his PG skills don’t develop. For Wiggins, his advantage is superior length (even to Barnes) and slightly better offensive numbers across the board than Barnes (most importantly, probably, FTA). Still, Self’s system is known to overinflate his players’ offensive numbers and without a more in-depth comparison it’s not clear Wiggins projects better than Barnes. Comparing LaVine and Wiggins, LaVine’s advantage in shooting gives him the better offensive outlook (even if shooting the most volatile skill), and while Wiggins is better defensively, he’s still overrated on that end. As a result, I have LaVine just ahead of Wiggins.
Tier 5:
10) Nik Stauskas
Strengths: great shooter with excellent range, ball handling, passing
Weaknesses: limited athleticism (especially vertically), poor defender
50th-percentile outcome: JJ Redick
Comments:
Admittedly, Stauskas doesn’t appear to have a very high ceiling, as at best he’ll be slightly better than JJ Redick on offense and at about Kyle Korver’s level on defense, and even then, there isn’t much evidence he’ll even approach Korver’s defensive mediocrity. However, the players ranked below Stauskas don’t have high ceilings either, and Stauskas at least has a very safe floor compared to them. Offensively, he profiles very similarly to JJ Redick; what differentiates the two of them (as well as Korver and Stephen Curry) from other elite offensive college players with questionable athletic tools (such as Jimmer Fredette, Luke Jackson, and Luke Babbitt) is that their college offensive production depended more on threes, and for prospects with limited athleticism, long-range shooting has translated better to the NBA than two-point shooting and free throws. While Redick had a unique work ethic, Stauskas is longer, more athletic both laterally and vertically, and more skilled in terms of creating offense due to better ball handling and passing abilities. It’s certainly somewhat concerning that his steal and block rates were very poor, at about Redick’s level and significantly worse than Korver’s, but that’s at least partially a product of John Beilein’s extremely conservative defensive philosophy that sacrificed physical play (and the corresponding stocks) in order to minimize fouls committed. As a result, Stauskas projects to be at least as good as Redick, with the potential to be even better if he can utilize his physical advantages more effectively on defense.
11) Adreian PayneWeaknesses: limited athleticism (especially vertically), poor defender
50th-percentile outcome: JJ Redick
Comments:
Admittedly, Stauskas doesn’t appear to have a very high ceiling, as at best he’ll be slightly better than JJ Redick on offense and at about Kyle Korver’s level on defense, and even then, there isn’t much evidence he’ll even approach Korver’s defensive mediocrity. However, the players ranked below Stauskas don’t have high ceilings either, and Stauskas at least has a very safe floor compared to them. Offensively, he profiles very similarly to JJ Redick; what differentiates the two of them (as well as Korver and Stephen Curry) from other elite offensive college players with questionable athletic tools (such as Jimmer Fredette, Luke Jackson, and Luke Babbitt) is that their college offensive production depended more on threes, and for prospects with limited athleticism, long-range shooting has translated better to the NBA than two-point shooting and free throws. While Redick had a unique work ethic, Stauskas is longer, more athletic both laterally and vertically, and more skilled in terms of creating offense due to better ball handling and passing abilities. It’s certainly somewhat concerning that his steal and block rates were very poor, at about Redick’s level and significantly worse than Korver’s, but that’s at least partially a product of John Beilein’s extremely conservative defensive philosophy that sacrificed physical play (and the corresponding stocks) in order to minimize fouls committed. As a result, Stauskas projects to be at least as good as Redick, with the potential to be even better if he can utilize his physical advantages more effectively on defense.
Strengths: length, three-point range
Weaknesses: age, defensive awareness, slow release, underwhelming stats
50th-percentile outcome: Marreese Speights with three-point range
Comments:
Many of the same principles that apply to Vonleh also apply to Payne, as the physical tools and skills are there for Payne to be a long, floor-spacing center as long as he can overcome his questionable court awareness and decision making. However, the biggest difference between the two is that Vonleh is over four years younger, and it’s much more likely that Vonleh will develop further than Payne. Furthermore, although they are similar in length, Payne is weaker and less athletic. Still, there are bright spots for each of his warts. While he is already 23, which would usually suggest that it might be less likely for him to continue developing, he’s improved significantly each year, which means his growth would only need to continue at its current rate (it wouldn’t need to accelerate). While his awareness on both ends is questionable, by all accounts he is a smart and hard-working player, and with the proper coaching, should be expected to improve in this regard. While he’ll never approach Ryan Anderson’s level as an active shooting option due to his slow release, he’s still a threat and will provide floor spacing for his teammates. While his stats were very underwhelming as a senior, especially his declining stocks, a major part of that can be explained by the fact that he had been dealing with mono since January. There isn’t great upside here, as he’s unlikely to ever become a force defensively, but the ability to provide floor spacing while credibly playing center offers a very solid floor. The Marreese Speights comparison might seem underwhelming, because Speights currently is one of the most negatively impactful players in the league, but his two biggest weaknesses are his propensity for 35% mid-range jumpers and his awful awareness; add three-point range and, hopefully, better decision making and there's potential for an above average starter.
Weaknesses: age, defensive awareness, slow release, underwhelming stats
50th-percentile outcome: Marreese Speights with three-point range
Comments:
Many of the same principles that apply to Vonleh also apply to Payne, as the physical tools and skills are there for Payne to be a long, floor-spacing center as long as he can overcome his questionable court awareness and decision making. However, the biggest difference between the two is that Vonleh is over four years younger, and it’s much more likely that Vonleh will develop further than Payne. Furthermore, although they are similar in length, Payne is weaker and less athletic. Still, there are bright spots for each of his warts. While he is already 23, which would usually suggest that it might be less likely for him to continue developing, he’s improved significantly each year, which means his growth would only need to continue at its current rate (it wouldn’t need to accelerate). While his awareness on both ends is questionable, by all accounts he is a smart and hard-working player, and with the proper coaching, should be expected to improve in this regard. While he’ll never approach Ryan Anderson’s level as an active shooting option due to his slow release, he’s still a threat and will provide floor spacing for his teammates. While his stats were very underwhelming as a senior, especially his declining stocks, a major part of that can be explained by the fact that he had been dealing with mono since January. There isn’t great upside here, as he’s unlikely to ever become a force defensively, but the ability to provide floor spacing while credibly playing center offers a very solid floor. The Marreese Speights comparison might seem underwhelming, because Speights currently is one of the most negatively impactful players in the league, but his two biggest weaknesses are his propensity for 35% mid-range jumpers and his awful awareness; add three-point range and, hopefully, better decision making and there's potential for an above average starter.
Tier 6:
12) Julius Randle
Strengths: strength, footwork
Weaknesses: awareness (especially defensively), lack of three-point range, poor length, small hands, average athleticism
90th-percentile outcome: David Lee
Comments:
The major disconnect I have with traditional scouts manifests in Randle, as his strengths are ones that scouts value more and his weaknesses are ones that I value more. As a result, the main reason I have him so low isn’t that I believe his skill levels are low but that those skills he lacks are more important than the ones he has. Still, I also do think there are some flags regarding those aforementioned skills given that the consensus appears to be that he’ll be a very effective post scorer in the NBA. Specifically, there is an argument to be made that while his brand of “bully ball” was successful on average in college, it will be much less so in the NBA, similar to how Shabazz Muhammad flopped in his rookie NBA season. As Dean Demakis writes, there is even statistical evidence of Randle dominating lesser athletes, as the discrepancy between his efficiency numbers against bad defenses and good defenses was especially significant. Furthermore, even if we take his overall performance, his offensive efficiency numbers compares similarly to those of JJ Hickson, Troy Murphy, and Anthony Bennett and poorly to those of Kevin Love, Kelly Olynyk, Derrick Williams, Jared Sullinger, Tyler Hansbrough, and Zach Randolph, and his stock numbers, turnover rate, and measurements are at or near the bottom of that group (his stocks and turnovers significantly so). All of these factors point to his offensive creation skills being much less of a sure thing than people think; the common comparison thrown around is Zach Randolph, but Randolph has much longer arms than Randle, and he’s unique in terms of his large posterior and sticky hands, which allow him to score and offensive rebound effectively despite questionable athleticism. Defensively, his NCAA stocks were considerably worse than those of Randolph, Hickson, Sullinger, and even David Lee, all players considered too unathletic to defend adequately in the NBA.
The bigger issue, however, is that even if we were to assume that Randle’s skills are able to reach the level that the most optimistic scouts believe they will, this upside of his is basically David Lee except with worse passing abilities, and David Lee is just not very good in today’s NBA, especially if his passing skills are reduced. Basically, the tenet is that it’s very difficult for an NBA big to be positively impactful without being able to shoot threes or play great defense (which usually means rim protection but elite mobility also works); in other words, floor spacing is essential for a big to contribute offensively, because isolation post play is just not efficient compared to systems that cultivate ball movement due to how effectively today’s defenses overload the strong side. Using 2013-2014 RPM numbers to roughly estimate what Randle’s 90th-percentile upside would be if he doesn’t develop three-point range, for someone to have been one of the best twenty PF/Cs this past season, he would have needed at least a 3.6 RPM. Assuming Randle’s defensive ceiling is that of an average PF, which is probably still a reach for him given his average athleticism and length and horrible defensive instincts (supported also by his horrendous stock numbers at Kentucky), that would place his DRPM at 0.8 (bigs naturally have negative ORPM and positive DRPM), and he would need at least an ORPM of 2.8 to be a top twenty big. The list of bigs with an ORPM greater than 2.8 included four players, each of whom is an elite three-point shooter: Nowitzki, Frye, Love, and Anderson. The six highest ORPM values for bigs who added offensive value primarily from the post were 2.65 (Griffin), 1.88 (Aldridge), 1.31 (Pekovic), 1.23 (West), 1.11 (Jefferson), and 1.06 (Randolph), and Randle’s ceiling is certainly much closer to the bottom four than to Griffin (an elite finisher and passer) or Aldridge (an elite midrange shooter with excellent length). Assuming Randle’s offensive ceiling is 1.2 ORPM and his defensive ceiling is 0.8 DRPM, his overall ceiling of 2.0 RPM wouldn’t have cracked the top thirty of bigs this past season. This is his ceiling barring unnatural growth and development, and as mentioned earlier, I’m extremely doubtful he can reach these levels on either end. Of course, the unknown variable here is whether he can (and will) extend his range to beyond the arc, as doing so likely raises his offensive ceiling to at least 2.0 ORPM, and allow him to be an above average starter. Still, the defense will likely never be there, and it’s a stretch to expect a big to develop three-point range in the future given that the league still has yet to fully understand the importance of floor-spacing bigs. As a result, a player with a ceiling of an average starter and a median outcome of a below average rotation player is just not worth selecting before the end of the first round, and even then, I’d probably avoid him.
13) Doug McDermottWeaknesses: awareness (especially defensively), lack of three-point range, poor length, small hands, average athleticism
90th-percentile outcome: David Lee
Comments:
The major disconnect I have with traditional scouts manifests in Randle, as his strengths are ones that scouts value more and his weaknesses are ones that I value more. As a result, the main reason I have him so low isn’t that I believe his skill levels are low but that those skills he lacks are more important than the ones he has. Still, I also do think there are some flags regarding those aforementioned skills given that the consensus appears to be that he’ll be a very effective post scorer in the NBA. Specifically, there is an argument to be made that while his brand of “bully ball” was successful on average in college, it will be much less so in the NBA, similar to how Shabazz Muhammad flopped in his rookie NBA season. As Dean Demakis writes, there is even statistical evidence of Randle dominating lesser athletes, as the discrepancy between his efficiency numbers against bad defenses and good defenses was especially significant. Furthermore, even if we take his overall performance, his offensive efficiency numbers compares similarly to those of JJ Hickson, Troy Murphy, and Anthony Bennett and poorly to those of Kevin Love, Kelly Olynyk, Derrick Williams, Jared Sullinger, Tyler Hansbrough, and Zach Randolph, and his stock numbers, turnover rate, and measurements are at or near the bottom of that group (his stocks and turnovers significantly so). All of these factors point to his offensive creation skills being much less of a sure thing than people think; the common comparison thrown around is Zach Randolph, but Randolph has much longer arms than Randle, and he’s unique in terms of his large posterior and sticky hands, which allow him to score and offensive rebound effectively despite questionable athleticism. Defensively, his NCAA stocks were considerably worse than those of Randolph, Hickson, Sullinger, and even David Lee, all players considered too unathletic to defend adequately in the NBA.
The bigger issue, however, is that even if we were to assume that Randle’s skills are able to reach the level that the most optimistic scouts believe they will, this upside of his is basically David Lee except with worse passing abilities, and David Lee is just not very good in today’s NBA, especially if his passing skills are reduced. Basically, the tenet is that it’s very difficult for an NBA big to be positively impactful without being able to shoot threes or play great defense (which usually means rim protection but elite mobility also works); in other words, floor spacing is essential for a big to contribute offensively, because isolation post play is just not efficient compared to systems that cultivate ball movement due to how effectively today’s defenses overload the strong side. Using 2013-2014 RPM numbers to roughly estimate what Randle’s 90th-percentile upside would be if he doesn’t develop three-point range, for someone to have been one of the best twenty PF/Cs this past season, he would have needed at least a 3.6 RPM. Assuming Randle’s defensive ceiling is that of an average PF, which is probably still a reach for him given his average athleticism and length and horrible defensive instincts (supported also by his horrendous stock numbers at Kentucky), that would place his DRPM at 0.8 (bigs naturally have negative ORPM and positive DRPM), and he would need at least an ORPM of 2.8 to be a top twenty big. The list of bigs with an ORPM greater than 2.8 included four players, each of whom is an elite three-point shooter: Nowitzki, Frye, Love, and Anderson. The six highest ORPM values for bigs who added offensive value primarily from the post were 2.65 (Griffin), 1.88 (Aldridge), 1.31 (Pekovic), 1.23 (West), 1.11 (Jefferson), and 1.06 (Randolph), and Randle’s ceiling is certainly much closer to the bottom four than to Griffin (an elite finisher and passer) or Aldridge (an elite midrange shooter with excellent length). Assuming Randle’s offensive ceiling is 1.2 ORPM and his defensive ceiling is 0.8 DRPM, his overall ceiling of 2.0 RPM wouldn’t have cracked the top thirty of bigs this past season. This is his ceiling barring unnatural growth and development, and as mentioned earlier, I’m extremely doubtful he can reach these levels on either end. Of course, the unknown variable here is whether he can (and will) extend his range to beyond the arc, as doing so likely raises his offensive ceiling to at least 2.0 ORPM, and allow him to be an above average starter. Still, the defense will likely never be there, and it’s a stretch to expect a big to develop three-point range in the future given that the league still has yet to fully understand the importance of floor-spacing bigs. As a result, a player with a ceiling of an average starter and a median outcome of a below average rotation player is just not worth selecting before the end of the first round, and even then, I’d probably avoid him.
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